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The Determinants of CEO Compensation in the U.S. General Merchandise Sector
Alan Harper and Zhenhu Jin
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between CEO compensation and
firm level performance in the U.S. General Retail Store Sector. We performed cross sectional
regressions on the entire sample and found no significant relationship existed between the level
of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables that proxy for firm performance. We
then performed a Stepwise regression and found that Market Capitalization and Gross Margin
were significantly related to the level of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables
that proxy firm performance. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation is positively related
to market capitalization and gross profit margin.
1. Introduction
Since the great recession of 2007-2008 CEO compensation has drawn a great deal of
attention and scrutiny from academics, regulators and the general public at large. However, most
of the attention has focused on top executive compensation in the financial services sector. Many
other industries have received less attention, most notably the U.S. Retailing Industry. This paper
is an attempt to fill this void by empirically examining the relationship between CEO
compensation and firm performance in the U.S. Department Store Industry.
In this study, we used for a sample of large General Merchandisers in the U.S. retrieved
from Fortune Magazine list of the top 500 companies. We chose a single industry to control for
firm heterogeneity (Chadwick, Hunter &Watson, 2004). Firms with similar operating
characteristics may provide more reliable comparisons and better explain CEO compensation
and firm performance (Crumley, 2006).
We develop cross sectional regression and stepwise regression models using variables
that proxy for CEO compensation and firm performance. Stepwise regressions have been used in
prior studies to examine the relationships between CEO pay and firm performance (Agarwal,
1981; Jalbert, Jalbert, and Furumo, 2013). We do this in order to determine whether a significant
relationship exists between the level of CEO compensation and a set of variables proxies for firm
performance for a sample of U.S. General Merchandise chains. Our results indicate that market
capitalization and gross margin are significantly related to CEO compensation.
The theoretical framework used in this study is agency theory. Agency theory suggests
that there might be conflicts of interest between to executives who manage the firm and the
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stockholders who own the firm. Managers may seek to maximize their own well-being at the
expense of the shareholders. The conflict of interest may be mitigated if top executive
compensation is significantly related to firm performance. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. In section one, we present a brief review of literature and the theoretical
background. Section II discusses the hypotheses, data and methodology. Section III provides the
empirical results,
1. Theoretical background
In their seminal work Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) demonstrate that managers will pursue
their own self interest when they do not own the entire of the firm. This self-interest behavior
might cause the manager to behave in a manner that may cause harm to the firm in an attempt to
increase their own compensation and other compensation related perks. Agency theory provides
the theoretical framework for examining this important topic. Kim and Gu, (2005), argue that
compensation based on managerial performance maybe better as opposed to monitoring the CEO
because monitoring managerial performance maybe more efficient due to the expensive nature of
monitoring. One way to gain a better understanding of managerial compensation is to examine
the relationship between CEO compensation and a set of specific firm variables that proxy
performance. Many studies have been conducted examine this relationship in several industries.
For example, Demirer and Yuan (2013), examine the relationship between executive
compensation and firm performance in the restaurant industry. They find that part of the
problem associated with executive compensation and firm performance is due to separation of
management from ownership. Kim and Gu (2005), examined the determinants of CEO cash
compensation for 73 U.S. Restaurant firms in 2002. They found a significant relationship existed
between CEO compensation and total assets and asset turnover. Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006)
examined the relationship between CEO pay, director pay, firm characteristics, CEO
characteristics, and governance variables. They found evidence that excessive CEO pay and
director compensation were correlated with firm underperformance. Yet in a prior study, Deckop
(1988) examined the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance and found
that CEO’s were not given an incentive to increase the size of the firm at the expense of profits.
In 2013, Nulla examined the relationship between CEO compensation, firm size, accounting firm
performance and corporate governance from 2005 to 2010 for 25 companies randomly selected
from the NYSE. Nulla (2013) found a positive relationship between CEO salary and bonus, total
compensation, firm size, accounting performance, and corporate governance. In another study,
Nulla (2013) examined the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation and found a
significant relationship existed between firm size and CEO compensation. The literature is
replete with studies that have examined CEO compensation and firm performance in many
industries. But very few studies have examined the determinants of CEO compensation and firm
performance of the Retailing Industry.
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2. Hypotheses, data and methodology
2.1. Hypotheses
The question addressed by this paper is whether a significant relationship exists between CEO
compensation and firm performance. It is hypothesized that CEO compensation should be
positively related to firm performance.
H0: There is no significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.
H1: There is a significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance
2.2 The data
The data for this study consists nine large U.S. General Merchandise chains that are publicly
traded on major stock exchanges. We identify our general merchandise chains using the Fortune
500 June 2016 issue along with Morning Star’s database. Our sample consists of annual data
collected from 2010 to 2015. Tables 1 lists the companies used in the study as well as their
annual revenues for year ending 2015.
Table I
Name

Revenue

Wal-Mart Stores

$482,130,000,000.00

Target

$73,785,000,000.00

Macy’s

$27,079,000,000.00

Sears Holdings

$25,146,000,000.00

Dollar General

$20,369,000,000.00

Kohl’s

$19,204,000,000.00

Nordstrom

$14,437,000,000.00

J.C. Penney

$12,625,000,000.00

Dillard’s

$6,755,000,000.00

2.3 Methodology
Cross sectional and Stepwise regressions are performed on the dependent and independent
variables in order to examine the relationship between CEO compensations and firm
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performance. Previous studies that have examined the relationship between CEO compensation
and firm performance have used both cross sectional and stepwise regressions performance
(Agarwal, 1981; Jalbert, Jalbert, and Furumo, 2013).
2.4 Proxies for the determinants of CEO Compensation
The proxies used are as follows:
Dependent Variable
CEO Compensation (CEOCOMP): CEO compensation is measured as total salary, which
includes grants of stock options, with the options, stock awards, non-equity incentive plan,
change in pension value and non-qualified deferred compensation, all other compensation.
Independent

Variables

1. Firm Size (SIZE): Firm size is measured as the natural log of the market value of equity
during our sampling period. Firm size or market capitalization is defined as the price per
share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Increasing the total market value
should have a positive relationship with CEO pay. The sign of the coefficient is expected
to be positive.
2. Return on Equity (ROE): Return on equity is a proxy for profitability. This metric
examines how shareholders were rewarded in the past year. It is hypothesized that the
coefficient between CEO compensation and ROE is positive.
3. Return on Assets (ROA): Return on assets is a proxy for how well the company is using
assets to generate profits. It is hypothesized that the coefficient between CEO
compensation and ROA is positive.
4. Gross Margin % (GM): Gross margin is a proxy for how well the company is managing
its gross profit to cover its selling and administrative costs.
5. Total Sales (TS): Total sales are measured as the natural log of the annual revenue.
6. Annual Stock Price Change (ASPC): The annual stock price change is measured as the
percentage change for the year. The months range from February to January. Retail
companies close their year-end January 31st.
7. Earnings per share: Earnings per share is computed as Net Income divided by the number
of shares outstanding.
8. Financial Leverage: Financial leverage is defined as the amount of debt used in the
capital structure of the firm.
9. Market Capitalization: Market capitalization is defined as the natural log of the number
shares outstanding times the share price.
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3. Empirical results
Table II: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

CEO

13,121,152

9.52471E6

55

ROA

7.1893

9.58428

55

GM

32.2631

5.53054

55

ROE

10.1571

65.76560

55

1.31257E8

Revenue

64,702,000,000

55

MCAP

35,638,000,000

6.47875E7

55

EPS

1.3918

6.18437

55

Stock

9.2322

31.39405

55

Leverage

4.5702

9.17274

55

Table 2 reports the means and standard deviation of the variables used in the cross section
regression for the entire sample. The sample size includes 55 observations for each variable.
There are a total of 495 observations. Not including revenue, market capitalization and CEO
compensation, the highest mean belongs to GM (Gross Margin) at 32.26 while the lowest mean
belongs to EPS at 1.39. Again, not including revenue, CEO compensation and market
capitalization, the highest standard deviation belongs to ROE (Return on Equity) at 65.76 while
the lowest standard deviation belongs to It is interesting note that the standard deviation for
revenue is .489 but the standard deviation for annual stock price change is 31.394. This indicates
that variability associated with annual stock price change is greater that the variability of the
market index which is 20.
Table III: ANOVAb
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Regression

2.130

8

.266

3.232

.005a

Residual

3.789

46

.082

Total

5.919

54

a. Predictors: (Constant), Leverage, Revenue, Stock, ROE, GM, EPS, ROA, MCAP
b. Dependent Variable: CEO compensation
Table IV: Coefficients
Model

1

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

(Constant)

3.984

.930

ROA

.001

.008

.040

t

Sig.

4.285

.000

.167

.868
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GM

.016

.010

.270

1.678

.100

ROE

.000

.001

.024

.150

.881

revenue1

.242

.239

.358

1.011

.317

MCAP

.101

.215

.174

.469

.641

EPS

.000

.010

.003

.016

.987

Stock

.002

.002

.166

1.121

.268

Leverage

-.009

.005

-.238

-1.746

.087

a. Dependent Variable: Comp1

Table 3 provides the results of the ANOVA. The ANOVA table shows a significant value of .005
and we can reject the null hypothesis that the value of the regression coefficient = zero. Table 4
shows the results of the cross sectional regression. The cross sectional regression results
indicate that none of the independent variables are significantly related to CEO compensation.
Based on these results, we can reject the alternative hypothesis that there is a significant
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Since our initial findings were
not significant, we decided to perform a Stepwise regression. Other studies such as Jeppson,
Smith and Stone (2009) and Jouber (2016) have used Stepwise regression to examine the
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. Table 5 depicts the model summary. In
model 1, the R-square is .249, which indicates that 24.9% of the variability in CEO
compensation is explained by the independent variables. Model 2 indicates that .305 or 30.5% of
the variability in CEO compensation is explained by the independent variables. The R square
changed by .056 when the second variable, GM (Gross Margin) is entered into the model and is
significant. Are results are similar to the results found by Nulla (2013) when examining the
determinants of CEO pay in the Restaurant Industry.

Table V: Model Summary
Model

Change Statistics
Sig. F
Adjusted

1

78

R Std. Error of the

Chang

R

R Square

Square

Estimate

R Square Change

F Change

df1

df2

e

.499a

.249

.235

.28962

.249

17.561

1

53

.000
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.552b

2

.305

.278

.28127

.056

4.194

1

52

.046

a. Predictors: (Constant), MCAP
b.

Predictors:

(Constant),

MCAP,

Table 6 provides the results of the Stepwise regression. Model 1 shows that MCAP (Market
Capitalization) is significantly related and important for the determination of CEO compensation.
The regression equation is CEO compensation = 4.940 + .289. This says that a unit increase in
market capitalization will increase CEO compensation by .289. Model 2 shows that market
capitalization and gross margin are significantly related to the level of CEO compensation and is
an important determinant of CEO compensation. The regression is CEO compensation = 4.256 +
.015. This says that a unit increase in gross margin will increase CEO compensation by .015.
Table VI: Coefficients
Model

1

2

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

(Constant)

4.940

.494

MCAP

.289

.069

(Constant)

4.256

.585

MCAP

.319

.069

GM

.015

.007

t

Sig.

9.992

.000

4.191

.000

7.279

.000

.551

4.654

.000

.242

2.048

.046

.499

a. Dependent Variable: CEO compensation

4. Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between CEO compensation and firm
level performance in the U.S. General Retail Store Sector. We performed cross sectional
regressions on the entire sample and found no significant relationship existed between the level
of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables that proxy for firm performance. We
then performed a Stepwise regression and found that Market Capitalization and Gross Margin
were significant related to the level of CEO compensation and a set of independent variables that

GM

Journal of Finance Issues Fall 2016

proxy firm performance. The implications from our findings suggest that CEO’s who increase
market capitalization and improve gross margins may increase the level of compensation they
receive. Further research should examine if these results are the same for other retail sectors.
Also, the determinants of CEO compensation could include factors beyond those used in this
study.
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